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The Role of Competition in Health Care:
A Western European Perspective1
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
Washington and Lee University
Diane Dawson
University of York
André den Exter
Radboud University

Abstract The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2004 report Improving
Health Care: A Dose of Competition expresses a clear allegiance to competition as the
organizing principle for health care. In Europe, by contrast, the key organizing principle of
health care systems is solidarity. Solidarity means that all have access to health care based on
medical needs, regardless of ability to pay. This is not to say that competition is not important in
Europe, but competition must take place within the context of solidarity. This article critiques the
report from a European perspective, describes the role of competition in Europe (focusing in
particular on European Union law), and suggests that the United States could learn from the
European perspective.
Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition (Federal Trade Commission/Department
of Justice [FTC/DOJ] 2004) has a clear vision of the health care policy universe in which
competition is at the center. If health care professionals, providers, suppliers, manufacturers, and
insurers would only be allowed to compete with one another, all of the desiderata of health
policy — access, quality, and cost control — would fall into place. Competition would lower
health care prices, which in turn would improve access to health care for those who currently
cannot afford it. Competition focused on quality would make health care safe and effective. All
that is necessary is that barriers to competition, public and private, be cleared away, and all will
be well.
The report on its face appears to be based on an impressive body of empirical evidence.
The authors of the report conducted an extensive literature search and heard from numerous
witnesses at several hearings.2 But in the end, the report’s conclusions seem to be driven by an
ideology, which the evidence is marshaled to support. The fundamental article of faith of this
ideology is that a society functions best when the members of that society, identified as
consumers, are unimpeded in their ability to satisfy their preferences by purchasing goods and
1
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services from producers, who are in turn unimpeded in their ability to compete with one another
for the allegiance of consumers. “A well-functioning market maximizes consumer welfare when
consumers make their own consumption decisions based on good information, clear preferences,
and appropriate incentives” (FTC/DOJ 2004: Executive Summary [ES], 4).
The health care systems of Western Europe are based on a quite different ideology:
solidarity. Solidarity means in principle that all members of society must have access to health
care, regardless of their ability to pay. Solidarity is not a woolly notion about the common good.
It has a specific meaning: that a health care system is organized and managed on the basis of
universal access, without risk selection, based on income-related premiums or tax finance, and
with no significant differences in the benefit package. It is a concept enshrined in the basic laws
and traditions of Western European countries and recognized by the decisions of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), as described below.
Western European countries are also, of course, interested in controlling health care costs
and in improving health care quality, just as Americans are, but they are committed to doing so
within the framework of solidarity. In each country, competition plays a role in organizing the
health care system, but it is valued only as a means to the end of maintaining a solidarity-based
health care system, and not as an end in itself. It is also not viewed as a panacea for the problems
that plague all health care systems.
Insofar as European health law and policy are concerned with competition, they have
focused primarily on eliminating barriers to competition, which is necessary to form a single
market in Europe. Single-market legislation has focused on realizing the four freedoms —
freedom of movement of goods, services, labor, and capital — within the European Union. Its
objective has been to remove impediments to competition that individual countries have erected
or may try to erect to protect their own national health care markets. The cases of the ECJ,
however, have not treated economic efficiency itself as a relevant goal of or justification for
competition, but have focused on whether restriction of the market freedoms is necessary to
protect the financial viability of solidarity.
This article offers a Western European comparative perspective of Improving Health
Care. It first briefly explicates the role of competition in the report and critiques the report’s
vision of that role. Next it outlines an alternative vision of the role of competition in health care
from a European perspective. In particular, it considers how European Community (EC)
legislation and the decisions of the ECJ directed at removing barriers to free trade and
competition within the European Union market are affecting health care systems. Finally, it
reflects briefly on the lessons the European experience has for the United States.
The Role of Competition in Improving Health Care
Improving Health Care offers a particular vision of a peculiar health care system. In most
developed nations, virtually all residents are covered by public or private health insurance. In the
United States, 45 million people, almost 16 percent of the population, are uninsured (DeNavasWalt, Proctor, and Mills 2004), yet the United States spends far more on health care than any
2

other country, whether measured by health expenditures per capita or percent of gross domestic
product spent on health care (Reinhardt, Hussey, and Anderson 2004). Finally, though it is true
that, as the report states, “At its best, American health care is the best in the world” (FTC/DOJ
2004: ES 1, chap. 1, 12), the same thing could be said about the health care systems of other
developed countries. A recent five-nation study looking at outcomes and processes of care
concluded that the United States performed best in some measures, worst in others, and
somewhere in between in most, just like the other four countries in the study (Commonwealth
Fund 2004). In sum, the American health care system is ailing.
The report suggests that the cure for the U.S. health care system is “a dose of
competition.” Its explanation as to how competition might be able to address the problem of
health care costs is relatively straightforward, though the barriers of information deficiencies and
agency failures that would have to be surmounted for it to do so are perhaps even more daunting
than the report acknowledges. The mechanisms through which competition might improve
quality are more speculative, and the report acknowledges that, 690 Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law to date, competition has focused on cost and largely ignored quality. How
competition can solve the massive access problem in the United States, however, is a mystery.
The report itself acknowledges that better-functioning markets are useless to those who lack the
resources to participate within them. It suggests hopefully that, if costs were controlled
effectively, access might marginally expand. It also offers a glowing evaluation of consumerdriven health plans as a means to expanding coverage, ignoring the growing body of scholarship
supporting the conclusion that consumer-driven health plans will worsen, not improve, risk
segmentation and access to health care for those in ill health (Jacobi 2005).
Competition Is Not the Only Game in Town
Within Europe, individual national health care systems can appear to be very different.
They vary in the mix of public, not-for-profit, and for-profit providers as well as in the form of
finance. What essentially distinguishes them from the U.S. system is the requirement that
instruments used to promote efficiency — cost control, cost-effectiveness, and quality — must
be consistent with universal access. European countries often use other policies to secure the
outcomes that some attribute to market competition in the United States Competition is not the
only game in town.
Cost Containment. Most European countries have a fixed global budget that contains total
expenditure. The effectiveness of this system varies. In England, a fixed national budget
allocated among local purchasers via a risk-adjusted capitation formula has, some would argue,
been overly successful in containing costs. In France, the global budget is often exceeded.
Despite this variable experience, overall these systems have been more effective in controlling
costs than has that of the United States with its reliance on competition. Controlling costs in
aggregate, however, does not place effective pressure on the least efficient hospitals. Some
European countries are adopting elements of prospective reimbursement, such as fixed
diagnosis-related group (DRG) prices, to exert downward pressure on the costs of relatively
high-unit-cost providers (Langenbrunner et al. 2005). Contrary to the message of Improving
Health Care, history may record that the most useful lesson from the U.S. health care system for
3

the rest of the world is the potential role for administered prices in promoting efficiency rather
than reliance on market competition.3
Reducing Excess Demand. Whereas the United States depends on local competition between
payers to reduce excess demand, European countries tend to achieve this through measures
adopted at the national level. Many countries have legal frameworks in which gatekeeping
restricts direct access to specialists. A patient must first consult a general practitioner, who
decides whether referral to a specialist is indicated. Other countries are moving in this direction
(Rodwin and Le Pen 2004).
The financial incentives for pharmaceutical companies and equipment manufacturers to
develop high-price new products are overwhelming, but many of these products are of
questionable cost-effectiveness. Often neither patients nor doctors have the information needed
to discriminate between new products. Within Europe, there is a two-pronged approach to
dealing with this problem. First, governments (or arm’s-length institutions) negotiate prices with
pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies. The effect this can have on the cost of
products has recently been highlighted by the debate over the contrast between U.S. and
Canadian prices for pharmaceuticals. Second, some European countries have created institutions
to review research evidence on the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
pharmaceuticals and medical procedures and to recommend which should (or should not) be
made available to insured patients. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE) in England is perhaps the best-known European example, but the approach is used in
other countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland (Jost 2005).
Health Outcomes and the Quality of Care. As in the United States, efforts to improve the quality
of health care delivered by different providers have lagged behind measures to control costs.
England has developed a system of quality assessment similar to the Health Plan Employer Data
and Information Set (HEDIS) “quality scorecard” in the United States. Hospitals are ranked with
respect to a variety of outcomes, including waiting times, mortality rates, and patient satisfaction.
Where hospitals appear to be delivering poor quality, action is taken at the national level to
improve or ultimately close the relevant units. Payers and patients can also use this information
to select providers, but, as in the United States, market response to information on quality has
been weak, so the focus has been on more direct methods to intervene where evidence of poor
quality emerges. Data in Sweden are collected by specialty on clinical health outcomes in
hospitals (national quality registers). This information is publicly available to patients and
clinicians. Other European countries (including Denmark and the Netherlands) have developed
systems of performance indicators that make information on provider performance available to
payers and patients. In this area, there is little difference between the United States and Europe.
The agenda is to develop more sensitive and discriminating measures of the quality of health
care and to present the information in ways that are relevant to regulators, payers, and patients.

3
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What Is Distinctive about the European Approach?
The outcomes that the United States seeks to secure from competition between local
payers and providers, European countries seek to secure through instruments that may deliver
these gains to the entire population — not just to patients in lucrative competitive markets. The
European approach has weaknesses. Political pressure from local populations to protect local
hospitals mutes the effectiveness of national cost-containment and quality initiatives. Merger and
reconfiguration of services are often seen as more acceptable responses than is closure of local
facilities, especially in semirural areas. In practice, this may be little different from the subsidies
paid under U.S. Medicare to rural hospitals.
Regulation of new entry and investment in new capacity is much tighter in Europe than in
the United States. This has enabled most countries to avoid much of the waste that the United
States has experienced from the development of excess capacity. As in most things, the impact of
regulating investment has been varied. In England, capacity constraints have been so severe as to
contribute to the emergence of some of the longest waiting times for elective care in Europe. In
France and Germany, on the other hand, regulation of new investment has been sufficiently
generous that waiting times are negligible. One consequence of regulating investment in new
capacity, however, is that less excess capacity means any competition among providers will be
relatively weak.
An interesting difference between the United States and Europe is the emerging role of
patient choice. Evidence suggests that the economic gains from competition in the United States
are strongly related to reduction in patient choice through managed care (Dranove and
Satterthwaite 2000). Within Europe, increasing patient choice has become an important policy
issue. Denmark for a decade and Norway and Sweden more recently have offered patients a
choice of any hospital in the country. Beginning in 2008, English patients will be able to choose
any English hospital offering the relevant treatment. French and German patients have always
had the right to choose a provider. Moreover, some of the most important health care cases
decided by the ECJ have addressed the issue of the extent to which countries may legally restrict
patient choice of providers located in EU countries other than the country where the patient is
insured. By adopting regulatory mechanisms other than competition between plans, many
European health care systems are attempting to secure cost and quality efficiency gains by
policies that do not rely on restricting patient choice of provider.
A European Role for Competition
Although Europe is distinct from the United States in its overriding concern for universal
access and risk pooling, the role of competition within this framework varies among European
health care systems, depending on historic inheritance of different national institutions and
willingness to embrace new policy initiatives.

5

Competition among Plans
One of the best documented characteristics of competition among third-party insurers is
risk selection, which can be direct where health plans concentrate on low-risk/low-cost
populations. It can also be indirect where payers compete for contracts with employers. A plan
offered to all employees of a university or software company will cover a lower-cost population
than will a contract with a coal-mining corporation. The chronically sick and unemployed are
always losers. This type of competition is unacceptable in Europe. The majority of Western
European countries have elected not to have competing payers. In the countries where
competition exists (Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium) the problem has been to ensure that
insurance plans do not compete by risk selection. This has often resulted in complex national
systems to equalize costs and risks among competing plans (sickness funds). As a consequence,
the scope for competition is severely limited.
This is not to say that there is no competition among plans. Dutch sickness funds offer
supplemental packages of amenity/luxury care. Under the new Dutch social health insurance
scheme, there will be as of 2006 a broader element of price competition among plans, though it
will be constrained by open enrollment, a prohibition on risk selection, and a risk equalization
scheme. Similar arrangements are under discussion in 694 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and
Law Germany with the so-called Burgerversicherung (citizen insurance) and in Switzerland with
the Krankenversicherung (sickness insurance).
Competition among Providers
A number of European countries have also seen competition among providers (hospitals
and professionals) as potentially useful. There are three main approaches to accomplishing this.
First, prospective reimbursement based on DRG prices creates a form of “yardstick” competition
(Shleifer 1985). Hospitals with unit costs above the set price must reduce costs to remain solvent.
Hospitals with costs below the set prices may increase the number of patients they treat. The
objective is to increase cost efficiency, particularly in markets where population density and
scale economies make direct competition among hospitals unlikely and inefficient.
Second, historically integrated public sector health care systems have introduced
“purchaser-provider splits” (Sweden and England). Publicly funded purchasers can shop around
and, on the basis of price and quality, negotiate contracts with hospitals. There are few published
studies on the effects of this direct competition. Propper, Burgess, and Green (2004) found that,
in England, quality, measured by mortality rates, fell in the most competitive markets, indicating
that competition might not be good for one’s health. Another study (Propper, Croxson, and
Shearer 2002) found that a different aspect of quality — waiting time — improved where
purchasers used their budgets to seek out alternative providers.
The third approach to encouraging competition among providers is to promote patient
choice of physician and hospital. While this has been the norm in France and Germany, patient
choice has also been introduced in traditional public sector health care systems, such as those in
Sweden, Denmark, and England, to create incentives for hospitals to compete by offering shorter
6

waiting times. There are few studies on the impact of these competition policies on performance
of hospitals. In Denmark, the effects appear limited (Vrangbaek and Bech 2004). In England,
pilot studies of choice have revealed a high willingness of patients to switch provider, but found
it difficult to identify the impact of patient choice per se on the competitive behavior of hospitals
(Dawson et al. 2004).
Although the role of competition among providers is of less importance in Europe than in
the United States, European competition law does in fact apply to the behavior of hospitals and
purchasers. Whether these health care organizations are in the public or private sector is
irrelevant. Even the secretary of state for health in England, the senior politician in charge of the
National Health Service (NHS), was held to have contravened European competition law when,
by executive action, he tried to ban the prescription of Viagra on the NHS (Regina v. Secretary
of Statefor Health ex parte Pfizer Ltd, Case No: C/4934/98, May 26, 1999). The key issue for
most European countries is how competition law, developed with reference to industries very
different from health, is to be applied to the highly regulated health care industry.
European Community Competition Law and Health Care
Within the European Union, competition policy is principally related to the functioning
of the common market as established by the free-movement provisions in the EC Treaty.
Community competition rules pursue the promotion of competition among undertakings
(enterprises) and aim to remove distortions of such competition. Two crucial provisions on
competition in the EC Treaty are articles 81 and 82, which prohibit agreements that distort
intracommunity trade and the abuse of a dominant position.4 These provisions also affect the
health sector and are most problematic in their application to the health insurance market when
insurance is provided as a public service.
Balancing the Solidarity and Freedom of Contract Principles
Traditionally, social health insurance has been classified as a public service, performing a
social instead of an economic function, and therefore is exempted from EC competition law.
However, the introduction of market elements into social health insurance challenges the
assumption that competition rules should not apply. It may change social insurance into a more
market-based activity. The main question is when does this happen? The fundamental issue is
whether the social activity’s underlying principle is the solidarity principle or the principle of
freedom of contracting that grounds the liberal market idea of the “invisible hand.”
True solidarity is solidarity with the unknown, or “Solidarität zwischen Fremden”
(Habermas 1993). In health care, it means that there is no relationship between the premium paid
4
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and access to the insurance entitlement (no equivalence). Unlike the ancient and Christian caritas
concept, solidarity among strangers is institutionalized by means of social security legislation
and therefore has been accomplished by (legitimized) force. This concept of compulsory
solidarity leads to political choices, such as the redistribution of resources in order to guarantee
equal access to health care. Its redistributive effect shows that solidarity is based on the notion of
social justice.
In contrast, the leading principle of economic activities is freedom of contract within a
market of demand and supply. Freedom of contracting has two dimensions: the freedom to select
one’s own contract partners and the freedom to define the content of the agreement. A typical
example is private (health) insurance, generally considered as an economic activity, in which
both the insurer and the insured are free to conclude an insurance policy and its conditions within
a competitive insurance market. Competition can be a useful tool to improve the market’s
efficiency, but it is certainly not the fundamental principle of economic activity.
The introduction of market principles into social health insurance reflects the struggle
between the competing principles of solidarity and freedom of contract. Confronted with
antitrust cases in health care, the ECJ balances both principles, although the arguments it uses are
rather ambiguous. An important conclusion that can be drawn from the Court’s more recent case
law is that the introduction of market principles into social health insurance — such as freedom
of choice of plans or provider — does not necessarily change the scheme’s social character.
Thus, competitive social health insurance schemes may still be exempted from EC competition
law, as long as the solidarity principle dominates.
The Court’s existing cases operationalize the solidarity principle in the field of social
security. First, the Court requires a social objective. It further requires that insurance benefits be
identical for all who receive them; that financial contributions be proportional to the income; that
sick and the healthy persons share the cost of sickness; and that contributions for insurance be
compulsory to the extent necessary for application of the solidarity principle.5 As a rule, social
security schemes fulfilling these conditions are not considered to perform an economic activity
within the meaning of competition law and, therefore, fall outside the scope of articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty. In principle, all conditions should be met, but because the weight or
importance of the conditions may differ, it is difficult to predict when a social security activity
will fall outside the coverage of European competition rules.
What has become clear so far is that the social purpose of an organization is not in itself
sufficient to preclude its activities from being classified as involving an economic activity for the
purposes of the competition rules. For example, in a case in which a social security organization
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offered an optional old-age scheme that operated on a capitalization basis6 with limited elements
of solidarity, the Court held that the organization was engaged in an economic activity and
therefore fell under the competition rules (Fédération Française des Société d’Assurance [FFSA]
Case C-244/94 ECR [1995] I-4013, par. 17 – 19). The principles established in the FFSA case
were confirmed in three parallel judgments in which a pension fund providing supplementary
old-age pensions to medical specialists was classified as an undertaking.7 The Court emphasized
that the funds themselves determined the amount of contributions and benefits and were operated
in accordance with the capitalization principle, under which the amount of the benefits depended
on the financial results of the investments made. The social purpose, the body’s nonprofit status,
and restrictive rules under which it operated made the scheme less exposed to competition rules,
but did not prevent such organizations from being classified as undertakings in terms of the
treaty. Thus, when elements of the capitalization principle, ergo, the freedom-of-contract
principle, are added to solidarity-based health insurance schemes and premiums are fixed in
relation to the degree of risk, the legal status of the scheme becomes increasingly blurred, and the
scheme can even take on the features of private insurance: “Too sharp an increase in, for
example, the non-income-related part of the premium (the nominal premium) could cause social
health insurance to lose its original character” (Hermans and Tiems 1997).
Unlike the capitalization or equivalence principle that governs private insurance, the
solidarity principle requires equalization of costs and risks. For example, the Court has held that
sickness funds are not in competition with one another or with private institutions with respect to
providing statutory pharmaceutical benefits where they provide equalization of benefits. Even
the latitude the sickness funds have for setting their contribution rates and their freedom to
compete with one another to some extent in order to attract members does not call into question
the noneconomic nature of their activity (C-263/01, AOK Bundesverband, ECJ, March 16,
2004). Indeed, the Court approved some competition with regard to contributions to be in
accordance with the principles of sound management (efficiency) and in the interest of the proper
functioning of the social security scheme. As long as a sickness fund is pursuing a specific
interest inseparable from or integrally connected with its exclusive social objectives, the fund
does not act as an undertaking and therefore competition rules are not applicable to it.
Even in a case in which the Court might conclude that sickness funds are performing an
economic activity as that concept is understood under the competition rules, a separate exception
under article 86(2) EC might apply.8 This provision provides for special immunity from the
general competition rules for certain undertakings that perform a task of “general economic
interest.” It is clear that sickness funds have been entrusted with performing such a service of
6
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general economic interest; namely, the provision of a solidarity-based health insurance system.
The Court did not rely on this line of reasoning in the AOK case since the sickness funds were
already exempted from article 81 EC because they were not engaged in economic activity.
Antitrust immunity was, however, accepted in a case involving private ambulance
services. The Court held that government authorities may refuse authorization to new private
ambulance-service operators when granting such authorization could have an adverse effect on
the functioning and profitability of the public ambulance service. Such an effect is likely because
profit-oriented ambulance operators prefer to operate mainly in the market of nonemergency
transport, where qualified personnel and equipment are less expensive. In the Glöckner case, the
ECJ ruled that, although existing ambulance services (providing both emergency and
nonemergency transportation) may have a quasi monopoly on the transport of patients, the
general economic interest task of transporting patients that was entrusted to these organizations
by law could justify a restriction or exclusion of competition if necessary to make the activity
economically feasible (Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner ECR [2001] I-5751, par. 65).
The Glöckner case has made it clear that “general economic interest” antitrust immunity,
originally meant for broadcasting, postal, and public transport services, can also be applied to the
health sector, both to health insurance funds as well as to health care providers. This provision
gives member states some ability to remove social policy fields such as health care from the
competition rules.
Conclusions Regarding European Competition Law
Although Community law explicitly excludes national health care policy from
Community intervention, competition law increasingly affects member states’ health care
schemes. Indeed, in principle, many forms of conduct necessary for the sustainability of social
security schemes are prohibited by the antitrust laws. Nonetheless, on a number of occasions, the
ECJ has ruled that anticompetitive elements in social security schemes can be justified to make it
possible to perform the particular tasks assigned to these schemes, either by denying the
economic nature of the social activity or by using the escape clause of “general economic
interest.” This openness to restrictions on competition to permit the fulfillment social purposes
may change when the solidarity elements become blurred or subordinated due to the introduction
of competitive elements into health care.
Lessons for the United States
In the United States, solidarity is not universally embraced as a foundational principle of
the health care system as it is in Europe. The fact that the report largely ignores solidarity as a
value certainly demonstrates this. There is an identifiable impulse within the United States to
provide some minimal level of health care to the poor. Cross-subsidization within health care
providers to finance uncompensated care, generally condemned by the report, is one
manifestation of this. Health care programs for the poor such as Medicaid and the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program 700 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law (SCHIP),
only briefly mentioned in the report, are another. But the provision of health care services to
10

indigents is not what solidarity is about. Solidarity is rather the principle that all citizens have an
equal right of access to health care, regardless of their economic status, by virtue of their being
citizens.
The best representation of the principle of solidarity in the United States is the Medicare
program, which was designed as a social insurance program along the lines of European models.
Like some European social insurance programs, it is financed through wage-based premiums. It
is not means tested and offers more or less equal benefits to all beneficiaries. Medicare has been
a remarkable success. It has extended coverage for basic health care to 41 million elderly and
disabled persons — the most expensive population for any nation to insure — while holding cost
growth below levels experienced by private insurers (Boccuti and Moon 2003). The FTC/DOJ
report is almost uniformly critical of Medicare, disparaging it because it (like most of the world’s
successful public insurance programs) largely relies on an administered price system for paying
providers.9 Yet the success, and the popularity, of the program cannot be gainsaid.
Medicare, like several European solidarity-based systems, has attempted to use
competition as a means of achieving more efficient provision of services. Congress has
repeatedly tried to support the existence of a Medicare managed care program based on
competition among private managed care organizations. Yet Medicare managed care has
succeeded neither in saving money for Medicare nor in demonstrably improving quality of care,
while proving to be remarkably unstable, with plans and providers frequently entering and
exiting. The current Medicare Advantage program has been able to attract plans only by paying
rates substantially in excess of what it costs to cover beneficiaries in traditional Medicare
(Berenson 2004). Attempts by traditional Medicare to purchase services competitively have
repeatedly foundered as they have run up against opposition from members of Congress who
vigorously support competition in principle but not in practice if it means that their constituents
might end up losing out (Cooper and Vladeck 2000).
Similarly, European attempts to incorporate market-based elements into solidarity-based
systems have not always gone smoothly. In general, however, European health care systems have
remained focused on goal of solidarity, seeing competition as a possible means to achieving this
end rather than as an end in itself. As we have seen, even the ECJ, despite its focus on the goal of
creating a Europe-wide market for goods and services, has acknowledged solidarity as
supervening value in health care insofar as the ECJ has shielded solidarity-based institutions
from the full brunt of competition law. It is quite possible that the Medicare program could
benefit from the experiences that European nations have had in experimenting with market-based
elements in their solidarity-based systems, just as those systems have learned from the
experience of Medicare with DRG-based administered prices. The main lesson that we can take
away from the European experience, however, is that, in health care, competition is a means, not
an end, and that one of the ends of a just health care system is solidarity.
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Conclusion
Improving Health Care promotes competition as the primary organizing principle of the
American health care system. The authors describe the key objectives for the U.S. health care
system as access, cost control, and quality. These objectives would appear little different from
those of the European “solidarity”-based system. Why then do we observe such significant
differences between the United States and Western European countries in the role competition
plays in delivering these system objectives? First, and of prime importance, the evidence is clear
that decentralized competitive markets do not deliver universal access to health care. This is
implicitly recognized in the United States by the key role of Medicare and Medicaid in
delivering health care to a significant proportion of the population. Health care, like education,
must be universally available in any society that espouses equality of opportunity. If market
competition obstructs achievement of this goal, other instruments must be used.
The role of competition in delivering the other two objectives — cost control and quality
— should also be judged by the evidence. There is much more competition among payers and
among providers in the United States than in Western Europe. The evidence indicates that
European instruments for controlling costs have been more effective than the U.S. reliance on
competition. All health care systems are experimenting with instruments to promote the quality
of health care while reducing inappropriate treatment. The evidence to date does not suggest that
countries relying on market competition are delivering better quality than those using other
instruments to influence the quality of health care.
Competition is one of many instruments that can be used to achieve health care policy
goals. Several European countries are experimenting with a greater role for competition in
securing improvement in efficiency and quality. When the evidence becomes available,
regulation and competition may be rebalanced. In the meantime, politicians and policy makers
often forget that health care, a significant sector of the economy, is subject to competition law. If
the role of competition is increased, judicial exemptions, based on solidarity, may be
undermined. At present, however, even the goal of achieving a common European market with
free movement of goods and services among member nations and free competition among
economic undertakings within the Community must yield when the goal of maintaining
solidarity in the face of disease and disability conflicts with it. In this respect, Europe has its
priorities straight, and the United States could learn profitably from it.
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